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BANKRUPTCY FEE APPLICATIONS: COMPENSABLE
SERVICF OR COST OF DOING BUSINESS?
INTRODUCTION
When submitting a fee application to a bankruptcy court, an attorney'
must provide a detailed statement of services rendered, time expended
and amounts requested.2 A detailed statement is required because bank-
ruptcy courts may award only reasonable compensation3 and must there-
fore make a factual determination as to whether the fees requested are
reasonable.4
The fee applicant bears the burden of proving entitlement to a re-
quested fee;5 the court, not the party at whose behest the services were
performed, determines whether services rendered are compensable.
Thus, an attorney who does not intend to serve as a volunteer must sat-
isfy this burden.7
1. Section 330 also provides for the compensation of other professionals performing
services in a bankruptcy case, such as accountants, auctioneers and "other professional
persons." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 330, 1103 (1988).
2. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a). Rule 2016(a) is designed to enable the court to
monitor compliance with the compensation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988), and Bankruptcy Rules. See 2 L. King, K. Klee, R. Levin, H.
Miller, P. Murphy, Collier on Bankruptcy 1 330.03, at 330-6 to -7 (15th ed. 1990) [here-
inafter 2 Collier on Bankruptcy].
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(1), 503(b)(4) (1988); In re Erewhon, Inc., 21 Bankr. 79,
90 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
4. The issues raised by section 330-whether "actual, necessary services" have been
performed and whether amounts requested as compensation are "reasonable"-are fac-
tual and arise whenever the court reviews a fee application. See In re Pettibone Corp., 74
Bankr. 293, 299 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1987). Indeed, bankruptcy courts have "an affirmative
duty to make an independent evaluation of reasonableness of all professional fees
notwithstanding objections made by any party." In re Bilgutay, 108 Bankr. 333, 336 n.2
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (citing In re Ross, 88 Bankr. 471, 474 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988));
In re Wildman, 72 Bankr. 700, 705 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1987).
5. See Pettibone, 74 Bankr. at 299; In re Affinito & Son, Inc., 63 Bankr. 495, 497
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re Crutcher Transfer Line, Inc., 20 Bankr. 705, 710 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Hamilton Hardware Co., 11 Bankr. 326, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1981); In re Aldersgate Found., Inc., 10 Bankr. 910, 918 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
6. With the benefit of hindsight, the court uses its "experience, observations and
expertise" to determine the necessity of particular services. See Pettibone, 74 Bankr. at
308 (citing In re Liberal Market, Inc., 24 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)).
7. There is little dispute that lack of specificity in a fee application may jeopardize a
fee award. See In re Fulton, 80 Bankr. 1009, 1011 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); In re Lock
Shoppe, Inc., 67 Bankr. 74, 75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); Affinito & Son, 63 Bankr. at 498;
In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 206, 207 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986) (citing In re Horn & Hardart
Baking Co., 30 Bankr. 938, 944 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)); In re Esar Ventures, 62 Bankr.
204, 205-06 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1986); In re Cumberland Bolt & Screw, 44 Bankr. 915,
916-17 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); Cohen & Thiros v. Keen Enters., 44 Bankr. 570, 573-74
(N.D. Ind. 1984); In re Nation/Ruskin, Inc., 22 Bankr. 207, 209 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982);
In re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 835 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); see also Butenas, Estab-
lishing Attorney's Fees Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 37 Bus. Law. 77, 83 (1981) (re-
printed in 87 Com. L.J. 237 (1982)) (attorneys advised to be prepared to justify every
hour because widespread failure of documentation will defeat application for fee award).
Moreover, on its face, Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) requires professionals applying for corn-
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Because preparing a fee application can be time-consuming, it is natu-
ral that an attorney ask himself, and then the court, whether the time
spent doing so is compensable as an "actual, necessary service." This
Note addresses whether time devoted to fee applications-in preparing,
presenting and defending them-is properly compensable from the bank-
ruptcy estate under section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
There are several schools of thought on this issue.' Two federal ap-
peals courts have held that time devoted to bankruptcy fee applications is
compensable.9 Federal district and bankruptcy courts in other circuits
are divided. While some courts simply grant10 or deny'1 such compensa-
pensation to file a "detailed statement" of services rendered and time expended thereon.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a). But see Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Charles
N. Wooten, Ltd. (In re Evangeline Ref. Co.), 890 F.2d 1312, 1326 (5th Cir. 1989) (fee
applications failing to reach an "ideal level of completeness" may suffice) (quoting Lawler
v. Teofan (In re Lawler), 807 F.2d 1207, 1212 (5th Cir. 1987)); In re Best Pack Seafood,
Inc., 21 Bankr. 852, 854 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) ("Absence of detail regarding the service
performed does not absolve the court from evaluating the service [sic] it may proceed
utilizing the information submitted and its knowledge of the case.") (citing In re Hamil-
ton Distribs., Inc., 440 F.2d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 1971); In re McAuley Textile Corp., 11
Bankr. 646, 648 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); In re Leader Int'l Indus., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 588 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1976)).
8. See Attorneys May Be Compensated for Time Spent in the Preparation, Presenta-
tion and Litigation of Fee Applications, Att'y Fee Awards Rep./Bankr. Fee Section, No.
4, Aug. 1985, at 25, 27; infra notes 8-10, 60-65 and accompanying text; see also Note,
Preemption of State Law Notice Provisions Governing the Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by
Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1986 Duke L. J. 176, 193 n.98 (1986) (collecting
cases and asserting there is no basis in law for denying compensation for fee application
preparation).
9. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Braswell
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 630 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 1980); Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v.
Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
10. See, e.g., In re Pontiac Hotel Assocs., 92 Bankr. 715, 717 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(bankruptcy court erred in failing to award attorney compensation for time spent on fee
application); Nunley v. Jessee, 92 Bankr. 152, 153-54 (W.D. Va. 1988) (attorney not pre-
cluded from recovery of cost of fee litigation on theory that nothing of value was contrib-
uted to debtor's estate); In re S.T.N. Enters., 70 Bankr. 823, 835 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987)
(preparation of fee application is compensable "[b]ecause of the meticulous record-keep-
ing requirements imposed by the Court"); In re D.C. Sullivan & Co., 69 Bankr. 212, 217
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (time spent on fee application is generally compensable but
amount of time devoted in case was unreasonable); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 45
Bankr. 381, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (fee application preparation is compensable
with expectation that time otherwise unnecessarily spent on case will be discounted).
11. See, e.g., In re The Vogue, 92 Bankr. 717, 720-26 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (at-
torneys for debtor in possession not entitled to compensation for fee application prepara-
tion); In re Holthoff, 55 Bankr. 36, 42 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985) ("Time charged for
letters, conferences, agreements and phone call regarding retainers and fee applications
is not compensable"); In re Wilson Foods Corp., 36 Bankr. 317, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1984) (time spent preparing fee application is not compensable and is properly absorbed
as cost of doing business); In re Hotel Assocs., 28 Bankr. 332, 333-34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1983) (trustee's counsel not entitled to compensation for time spent preparing fee applica-
tion); In re Liberal Market, Inc., 24 Bankr. 653, 661 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (computa-
tion of fees is cost of doing business and is not chargeable to debtor's estate); In re
Erewhon, Inc., 21 Bankr. 79, 89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (counsel for secured creditor not
entitled to recover for time spent justifying request for an excessive fee).
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tion, several opinions have advanced various compromise approaches, 12
indicating a general uneasiness towards awarding compensation, but nev-
ertheless a compulsion to award something, albeit at reduced rates or
only in special circumstances.
Part I of this Note provides background on the court-awarded com-
pensation scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. It also discusses the legisla-
tive history and congressional purpose behind the change made by
section 330 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act to the previous standard
for professional compensation. Part II analyzes the text of the statute
and critically discusses its application by the courts. More specifically,
the current debate is criticized for failing to apply the plain language of
the statute to the issue. The Note concludes that a proper application of
section 330(a)(1) should, in most cases, preclude compensation for fee
application efforts, or substantially restrict amounts actually awarded,
even if fee application preparation is properly considered an "actual, nec-
essary service." Furthermore, the Note contends that compensating at-
torneys for time devoted to obtaining their fees violates the traditional
American rule of attorney fees, provides the wrong incentives to lawyers,
and helps foster a negative public image of bankruptcy attorneys that
could ultimately frustrate the congressional purpose behind the change in
compensation standards made by the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.
I. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE-
OPERATION, HISTORY & PURPOSE
A. Court-Awarded Compensation for Bankruptcy Attorneys
As an exception to the "American Rule" of attorneys' fees 13-that a
litigant bear his own costs, win or lose-a bankruptcy attorney's fees
may be paid out of a bankruptcy estate pursuant to statutory authoriza-
tion. 4 This exception is provided under section 330 of the Bankruptcy
Code.1 It authorizes the bankruptcy court to award "reasonable com-
pensation" to certain professionals, based on five factors,16 subject to
12. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
13. See, eg., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(re-stating "American Rule" and holding exceptions are properly made only by statute);
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (stating traditional American
rule); Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Attor-
neys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. Marshall L. Rev. 331, 335 n.13 (1980) (discussing
traditional American rule and its rationale).
14. See Lieb, Sections 330, 331, 503(b), 506(b)-Attorney Compensation, 1987 Ann.
Surv. Bankr. L. 427, 427. The Bankruptcy Code is one of approximately 200 federal
statutes carving out an exception to the "American Rule." See id.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988). However, because the trustee represents the bank-
ruptcy estate, see 11 U.S.C. § 323(a), an award of fees from the estate for the trustee's
counsel does not constitute "fee shifting" that would be contrary to the "American Rule"
absent statutory authorization.
16. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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compliance with other sections of the Code. 7
Before an attorney can qualify for compensation under the Code, how-
ever, the court must approve of his employment by the trustee, the
debtor, or creditors' and equity security holders' committees.18 In addi-
tion, notice19 and a hearing ° is required before compensation can be
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988). The limiting sections are: section 326, placing a
cap on the amount of compensation to be awarded a trustee, pegged to amounts ulti-
mately distributed to creditors; section 328, permitting compensation agreements be-
tween parties and professional persons, subject to review and ultimate approval by the
court; and section 329, requiring a debtor's attorney to file a statement with the court of
compensation agreements made with the debtor within one year prior to the filing of the
petition, subject to cancellation by the court if found to be unreasonable. Thus, the
Code's compensation scheme clearly envisions a large degree of court involvement in the
employment and compensation of bankruptcy professionals, as has traditionally been the
case. See id. §§ 326, 328, 329.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988) (employment of professionals by bankruptcy
trustee); id. § 1103 (employment of professionals by official creditors' and equity security
holders' committees); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 (requiring application for order of approval
of employment under sections 327 and 1103); see also Butenas, supra note 7, at 81 ("An
attorney has no right to compensation without prior court approval of... appointment as
counsel to the trustee, to the creditors' committee in a reorganization, or to a debtor in
possession in a reorganization.") (footnotes omitted).
Prior court approval, however, may not be an absolute prerequisite to receiving com-
pensation from the estate; services that have not been pre-approved may be compensable
on equitable grounds. See Windsor Communications Group v. Rogers (In re Windsor
Communications Group), 68 Bankr. 1007, 1013, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1986); cf In re Gryn-
berg, 6 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (M1B) 541, 543 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (despite absence of
specific statutory authorization, reimbursement of expenses of committee members al-
lowed under section 503(b)(3)(D) because of" 'substantial contribution'" to case). See
generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, % 330.04[2], at 330-18 to -21 n. 11 (dis-
cussing split of authority on whether failure to obtain prior court approval of employ-
ment can be cured by nunc pro tunc order). But see In re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826,
828 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (prior court approval of services is "basic condition prece-
dent to any fee application").
Further, section 503(b) may permit reasonable compensation for attorney services to
an unofficial creditors' or equity security holders' committee "in making a substantial
contribution" to a case under chapters 9 or 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D), 503(b)(4)
(1988). In practice, this section is understood as authorizing compensation for attorneys
who have made "substantial contributions" to cases under chapters 9 or 11 (generally
serving creditors)-as opposed to merely performing "actual, necessary services" under
section 330-but who have worked without a court order of employment. See Lieb,
supra note 13, at 427-28. But see In re Carolina Sales Corp., 45 Bankr. 750, 753 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1985) (section 503(b) does not provide alternative basis for compensation
where professional's employment has not been pre-approved under section 327(a)).
The vagaries and conflicting interpretations of the Code's requirements of court-or-
dered employment and the requirements of the "substantial contribution" test under sec-
tion 503(b), however, are beyond the scope of this Note. For more on the unsettled law
of section 503(b) see Lieb, Sections 329-331-Attorney Compensation, 1986 Ann. Surv.
Bankr. L. 329, 329-35.
19. The Bankruptcy Rules require twenty days notice by mail to parties in interest of
hearings on fee applications. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(7). The required notice
"shall identify the applicant and the amounts requested." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(c)(2).
The court may order that only committees, creditors and equity security holders, who
formally request notice of fee applications by serving such request on the trustee or the




awarded, thus allowing all interested parties an opportunity to object to
the requested fee award.
B. The Legislative History and Purpose of Section 330(a)
Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which established the
Bankruptcy Code,21 the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and its various amend-
ments comprised the operative bankruptcy law.22 Under the 1898 Act,
attorney compensation was governed by former Bankruptcy Rule 219,23
which allowed awards of reasonable compensation, giving "due consider-
ation to the nature, extent, and value of the services rendered as well as
to the conservation of the estate and the interests of creditors."' 4
Although three other factors in Rule 219 were to be considered in
making an award of compensation, the fourth factor-"conservation of
the estate"-most frequently resulted in severe limitations on an attor-
ney's ultimate fee award.25 This so-called "spirit of economy" eventually
reached the dizzying point of arbitrary compensation awards based on
20. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a), 331, and 503(b) (1988).
A hearing will not be necessary if a party in interest does not timely request one. See
11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(B)(i) (1988). See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, %
330.03[2], at 330-10 to -11 & n.11 (discussing notice and hearing requirements). Proper
notice, however, is always required. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(B) (1988).
Some courts, however, have held that a full evidentiary hearing is required if requested
by a fee applicant, and that a court's failure to hold one is an abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Baddock (In re First Colonial Corp. of Am.), 544
F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir.) (failure to require documentation of requested fee, failure to
hold evidentiary hearing, and failure to justify fee award with "findings and reasons"
constitutes abuse of discretion), cert denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); In re Ralph Mar-
cantoni & Sons, Inc., 62 Bankr. 245, 248 (D. Md. 1986) (opportunity to introduce testi-
mony is "important component" of due process right to be heard at fee application
hearing); In re Foster Iron Works, 3 Bankr. 715, 718 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (court erred by
refusing to conduct requested evidentiary hearing on application for fees).
21. (Bankruptcy Reform) Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
22. See generally Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 28 De Paul L.
Rev. 941, 941 n.1 (1979) (reprinted in 54 Am. Bankr. L.J. 275, 275 n.1 (1980)) (describ-
ing four earlier bankruptcy acts).
23. See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, 330.02, at 330-3 to -4; Anderson &
Miller, New Rules for Compensation in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 86 Com. L.J. 79, 80
(1981); Butenas, supra note 7, at 77.
24. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 219(c)(1), 11 U.S.C. app. (1976); see also 2 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 1, % 330.02, at 330-3 to -5 (discussing compensation under Rule 219);
Butenas, supra note 7, at 77-78 (same).
25. See, eg., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429, 432 (5th
Cir. 1968) (reversing fee award because bankruptcy court failed to consider "the public
interest... inherent in bankruptcy matters," even though time spent on case, complexity
of case and results obtained had been duly considered), cert denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
see also Anderson & Miller, supra note 23, at 81 (rule of conservation may have been
developed to set aside any notion that bankruptcy was intended "for the relief of attor-
neys" rather than for the relief of debtors (quoting In re Orbit Liquor Store, 439 F.2d
1351, 1353 (5th Cir. 1971))); Butenas, supra note 7, at 77 ("Conservation of the estate
became the predominant factor").
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criteria such as a district court judge's salary.26
The doctrine of Randolph v. Scruggs,2 7 which limited compensable
services to those providing some benefit to the estate and its creditors,
was an additional obstacle to compensation.28 In addition, the absence of
a provision for interim compensation also restricted compensation under
the Act by often forcing attorneys to finance the cost of a bankruptcy
case for years before receiving any compensation for their efforts.29
In response to these difficulties,30 section 330 was included in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197831 as part of a broader restructuring of
the bankruptcy laws. Section 330 significantly differed in one respect
from the standard of compensation in Rule 219; it omitted reference to
"conservation of the estate and the interests of creditors" and substituted
"the cost of comparable services" in non-bankruptcy matters.32 The
26. See York Int'l Building, Inc. v. Chaney (In re York Int'l Building, Inc.), 527 F.2d
1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp. (In re
Beverly Crest Convalescent Hosp.), 548 F.2d 817, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1977); Official Credi-
tors' Comm. of Fox Markets, Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1964), cert
denied, 380 U.S. 978 (1965); Anderson & Miller, supra note 23, at 81; Butenas, supra
note 7, at 77-78.
27. 190 U.S. 533 (1903).
28. See id. at 539; see also Taylor v. Des Moines Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Urban Am.
Dev. Co.), 564 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (benefit to estate relevant but
not sole factor); U.S.A. Motel Corp. v. Danning (In re U.S.A. Motel Corp.), 521 F.2d
117, 119 (9th Cir. 1975) (debtor's attorney should not be compensated in unsuccessful
reorganization as he would be in successful one).
Under the Code, courts have held "benefit to the estate" to be a factor in determining
the reasonableness of a fee request. See In re Global Int'l Airways Corp., 18 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 310, 313 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Moore, [1985-1986 Trans-
fer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 70,965, at 88,447 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986); In re
Neibart Assocs. Press, Inc., 58 Bankr. 212, 215 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Spencer,
48 Bankr. 168, 171 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Duque, 48 Bankr. 965, 975 (S.D. Fla.
1984); In re Zweig, 35 Bankr. 37, 37-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); see also In re Rhoten, 44
Bankr. 741, 743 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (accepted view is that only services of debtor's
attorney that benefit estate, and not debtor personally, are compensable); In re Garnas,
40 Bankr. 140, 141-42 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1984) (given purpose of chapter 11, "value" to
debtor is major factor). See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, S 330.05[d],
at 330-40 to -48 (describing benefit-to-the-estate doctrine and its current status under the
Code).
29. See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, 1 331.01, at 331-1 to -5
(describing evolution of "judicially created law" of allowances of interim compensation).
Commentators, however, point out that under the Act, case law evolved to allow
awards of interim compensation on equitable grounds. See id.; Anderson & Miller, supra
note 23, at 82 (citing In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D.N.J.
1971)). This type of adjustment was also made to the benefit-to-the-estate requirement,
see supra note 27, by allowing compensation for certain chores that produced no tangible
benefit to the estate, but which were nonetheless necessary to its administration. See
Anderson & Miller, supra note 23, at 81.
30. See generally Anderson & Miller, supra note 23, at 80-85 (describing problems
engendered by compensation provisions under the Act and legislative response).
31. (Bankruptcy Reform) Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). See generally Klee, supra note
21, at 942-60 (describing ten-year history of Code and providing useful nine-step ap-
proach to using legislative history to interpret its provisions).
32. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988) with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 219, 11 U.S.C. app.
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clearly stated purpose behind the change in the compensation standard
was to encourage specialists to enter and continue practicing in the bank-
ruptcy field instead of seeking higher fees in other areas of the law.33
While courts and commentators agree that this was the general pur-
pose behind section 330(a), inconsistent House and Senate versions of
section 33034 have caused some confusion regarding the final disposition
of the "spirit of economy."' 35 Ultimately, Congress adopted the House
version of section 330, and explicitly rejected inconsistent language in the
Senate version 36 that indicated that some notion of economy was to re-
main in compensation determinations.37
(1976). See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, 1 330.05[2][a], at 330-27
("only significant departure from prior law.., is the abandonment of the strict principle
of economy").
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 3, at 329-30, reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6286 [hereinafter House Report No. 595].
Courts uniformly agree that this is the purpose of section 330 and frequently quote the
House Report verbatim. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.
1985); In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 25 Bankr. 747, 754 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); In re The
Vogue, 92 Bankr. 717, 722-23 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Four Star Terminals,
Inc., 42 Bankr. 419, 429 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984).
Commentators concur. See, eg., Anderson & Miller, supra note 23, at 85 ("One might
surmise that Congress understood and legislatively adopted the premise that 'you get
what you pay for.' "); Butenas, supra note 7, at 78-79 ("The rationale for the change is
... to encourage successful administration of estates by attracting bankruptcy specialists
of high quality."); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, % 330.05[2][a], at 330-28 to -29
("spirit of economy has been abandoned under the Code in favor of the new policy that
[bankruptcy attorneys] receive compensation on parity with that received by attorneys
performing services in comparable situations.").
Congress made an insignificant "stylistic" change to section 330(a) by section 433 of
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. See In re Four Star
Terminals, Inc., 42 Bankr. 419, 428 n.4 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984) (citing S. Rep. No. 65,
98th Cong. 1st Sess. 75, (1983)).
34. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988) ("and the cost of comparable services")
with S. 2266 § 330(a)(1) ("and considering the cost of comparable services" (emphasis
added)), reprinted in 9 Bankr. Serv. (L. Ed.) § 83:31 app. 311, 349 (1979). Although the
language difference between the two versions is only subtle, the underlying substantive
difference is highlighted by their conflicting reports. Compare House Report No. 595,
supra note 33, at 6286 (section 330 overrules notions of economy) and 124 Cong. Rec.
32,394-395 (1978) (same) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) and 124 Cong. Rec. 33,994 (1978)
(identical remarks of Sen. DeConcini) with S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 40-41
(favoring retention of some notion of economy in compensation determinations), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5826-27 [hereinafter Senate
Report No. 989].
35. Compare In re Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1985) (section 330
intended to overrule principles of economy) with Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons (In re
Yermakov) 718 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (" 'economy in administration is the
basic objective'" (quoting Senate Report No. 989, supra note 34, at 5826)).
36. See 124 Cong. Rec. 32,394-95 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,994
(identical remarks of Sen. DeConcini) ("Section 330(a) contains the standard of compen-
sation adopted in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House rather than the contrary standard
contained in the Senate amendment.... Notions of economy of the estate in fixing fees
are outdated and have no place in [sic] bankruptcy code." (citations omitted)).
37. "An allowance [of fees] is the result of a balance struck between moderation in
the interest of the estate and its security holders and the need to be 'generous enough to
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The House may have gone too far, however, with its unequivocal rejec-
tion of economy. Courts have been unable to abandon comfortably all
notions of economy when making compensation decisions,38 and rou-
tinely disallow compensation for various reasons.39 This is probably the
result of the base restriction on compensation implicit in the language of
section 330(a)-i.e., it is axiomatic that section 330(a)'s requirement that
services be actual and necessary forbids compensation awards from the
estate for unnecessary services." Thus, the language of section 330(a),
and its implicit frugality, conflicts with statements made on its passage
explicitly rejecting notions of economy. After all, it is not economical to
pay for services that are neither "actual" nor "necessary" or to pay more
than the actual value of those services.
The unequivocal rejection of economy found in the legislative history
accompanying H.R. 8200 (the House version of section 330(a))41 has
thus proved too broad. Notwithstanding remarks on the passage of H.R.
8200 that expressly rejected the standard set forth in the report accompa-
nying S. 2266,42 the more moderate Senate version has proven to be more
provident and common-sensical. This is apparent because even though
bankruptcy courts routinely slash requested fees, thus evidencing far less
than a total abandonment of principles of economy,43 the Congressional
goal of attracting attorneys to bankruptcy practice by making it more
lucrative has been achieved.' This clear legislative purpose notwith-
standing, inconsistent views in Congress regarding how it should be
encourage' lawyers and others to render the necessary and exacting services that bank-
ruptcy cases often require." Senate Report No. 989, supra note 34, at 5826 (citations
omitted).
38. See Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons (In re Yermakov), 718 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.
1983).
39. See, e-g., In re Sumthin' Special, Inc., 2 Bankr. 743, 748 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (trustee's
attorney cannot be compensated for unnecessary work); In re Wonder Corp. of Am., 72
Bankr. 580, 591 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987) (court has duty to disallow compensation for
services that are "not reasonably necessary... because of an attorney's excessive caution
or overzealous advocacy."), aff'd, 82 Bankr. 186 (D. Conn. 1988); In re Brunel, 54
Bankr. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (unnecessary services will be deducted from re-
quested fee); In re Westwood Asphalt, 45 Bankr. 111, 111 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984)
(court must disallow compensation for duplicative services); In re G.A.C. Corp., 14
Bankr. 252, 255 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (debtor should not bear expense of unreasonable dupli-
cation of services); In re Sutherland, 14 Bankr. 55, 58 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1981) (disallowing
attorney time billed that was "ill spent").
40. See Yermakov, 718 F.2d at 1470; see also In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42
Bankr. 419, 434 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984) (funds needed by chapter 11 debtor to effect
reorganization should not be taxed with undue expenses in form of attorney's fees).
41. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
44. Speaking of the changes in compensation standards made by the Code, one com-
mentator has stated that
[t]here is little danger of niggardly compensation in the Bankruptcy Code.
Market rate, recognition of skill and even bonus for high success are well im-
planted in the statutory terms or legislative history. Fear of mutiny to more
lucrative fields has not taken place. Quite to the contrary. Insolvency practice
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achieved have left uncertain what the full effect of section 330(a)'s new
standard of compensation should be.45 Hence, to the extent that princi-
ples of economy have survived the reports accompanying H.R. 8200, and
to the extent the congressional goals have been achieved, compelling ar-
guments for compensating fee application work are weakened.
II. SECTION 330-As WRIrEN AND AS APPLIED
A. The Statutory Language
Section 330, on its face, does not address the question of compensating
attorneys for time devoted to fee applications.46 Nevertheless, it supplies
the standard by which bankruptcy attorneys are to be compensated, and
therefore, should guide any analysis of the issue.
Analytically, section 330(a) sets up a two-stage test for determining
whether and in what amount to compensate bankruptcy attorneys and
other professionals for services rendered.47 Before compensation can be
awarded, the court must first be satisfied that actual and necessary serv-
ices have been performed.48 If the applicant meets this burden, the court
enjoys a prestige marked by contrast to that of a few years ago. Firms which
disdained the work now eagerly seek the business.
Aaron, The Bankruptcy Bench, 89 Com. L.J. 47, 47 (1984). Indeed, the Honorable Har-
old Lavien, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Massachusetts, has re-
marked quite candidly that
[u]ntil very recently bankruptcy, like sex, was looked upon as a necessary
part of life, but not anything that respectable citizenry would publicly acknowl-
edge participating in. In the last decade, even the most bluenosed firms have
not only established bankruptcy departments, they have eagerly embraced the
practice which our exploding ... credit economy has caused to become the
fastest growing area of the law.
Lavien, Fees as Seen from the Bankruptcy Bench, 89 Com. L.J. 136, 136 (1984).
45. See DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bankruptcy Code-A Primer,
55 Am. Bankr. L.J. 43, 61 (1981); see also Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons (In re Yermakov),
718 F.2d 1465, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1983) (because economy in administration is still a basic
objective under the Code, contingent fee limited to actual, necessary services); In re Petti-
bone Corp., 74 Bankr. 293, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Though economy of estate is no
longer a standard, it does not follow that the legal engine may always operate at full
throttle."); In re Shades of Beauty, Inc., 56 Bankr. 946, 951 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(services must still be actual and necessary), aff'd, 95 Bankr. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). But
see Butenas, supra note 7, at 78 n.7 (DeNatale's "equivocal reading of congressional in-
tent" is "incorrect in view of significant language differences" between House and Senate
versions of section 330(a) and "principles of legislative research" propounded by Klee).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988).
47. This is not explicitly spelled out in the statute, but it is undeniably clear that this
is what section 330(a)'s language embodies: "the court may award... reasonable com-
pensation for actual, necessary services .... based on the nature, the extent, and the
value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable serv-
ices [in non-bankruptcy cases]." 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988).
48. See id. At least two courts have explicitly identified this as the first step in a
compensation determination. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.
1985); In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 Bankr. 419, 430 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984); see
also In re Pettibone Corp., 74 Bankr. 293, 299 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (whether services
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may then award reasonable compensation based on five factors:49 1) the
nature of the services rendered,50 2) the extent of those services,5" 3) their
value,52 4) the time spent performing those services53 and 5) the cost of
are actual, necessary and reasonable are factual issues that arise on presentation of every
fee application).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988).
50. For the purpose of a fee determination, the "nature" of an attorney's services is
evaluated by the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented and the formidability of
adversaries encountered. See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, 1
330.05[2][c], at 330-38 to -39 (describing components of "the nature of services rendered"
element of reasonable compensation under section 330(a)); Butenas, supra note 7, at 79
(grouping fee awards criteria around three main factors-quantity, quality and result).
This factor might justify an award of compensation for fee application related efforts
where an attorney faces clamorous or unyielding opposition to his application. But could
it lead to the applicant and the opposing party both claiming entitlement to compensation
for opposing and defending the same fee application on the ground that they were provid-
ing "services" to the estate?
51. Courts and commentators do not offer any useful explanation of what the "ex-
tent" of an attorney's services is supposed to denote. It probably refers to elements, such
as an attorney's ability, the skills required, and time demands of the case, that could
properly be included in the time, value and nature components of reasonableness under
section 330(a). See generally Butenas, supra note 7, at 83-84 (discussing broad "quality
factor"). Its appearance should thus be considered superfluous.
52. The value of an attorney's services appears to be determined by assessing actual
contributions or benefits to the estate realized by the attorney's efforts, and should be
considered the single most important factor in calculating a fee award. See In re Jessee,
77 Bankr. 59, 60 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); Butenas, supra note 7, at 84. "The main aim of
bankruptcy, apart from a fresh start for the debtor, is 'a ratable distribution of the maxi-
mum realizable cash to creditors.'" Butenas, supra note 7, at 84 (quoting Lavien, A
Public Relations Problem with Regard to Fees and a Suggested Remedy, 81 Com. L.J. 504,
509 (1976)).
The majority rule regarding compensation for services performed by a debtor's attor-
ney requires that these services confer some benefit on the estate as a prerequisite to any
award of fees. See In re Reed, 890 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Holden, 101
Bankr. 573, 574-75 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989); Jessee, 77 Bankr. at 61; In re Chapel Gate
Apartments, Ltd., 64 Bankr. 569, 576 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re Spencer, 48 Bankr.
168, 171 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985). Why the majority rule does not apply to compensating
officers, however, is not readily (if at all) apparent.
In this light, when an attorney confers great benefits on the estate, courts have awarded
premium fees. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885, 890 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1985); In re Penn-Dixie Indus., 18 Bankr. 834, 836-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In
re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 835 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
It would thus appear that bankruptcy is sometimes practiced on a contingent basis.
This is certainly true when services are rendered before it is determined whether sufficient
funds in the estate exist to make a complete fee award. See generally 2 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 1, % 330.05[2][d], at 330-42 to -48 n.28 (discussing contingent nature of
bankruptcy practice and risk factor fee enhancements). Because bankruptcy attorneys,
however, enjoy first priority under the Code, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 503(b)(2), the risk
of non-payment of earned fees is significantly diminished.
Regardless of the importance of value, however, courts nevertheless consider the time
spent on a case to be a factor of major importance in making a section 330(a) fee award.
See infra note 53.
53. The time spent on a case is commonly viewed as an essential starting point for any
analysis of the reasonableness of a fee request. See Blake v. Doyle (In re Doyle-Lunstra
Sales Corp.), 19 Bankr. 1003, 1005 (D.S.D. 1982); In re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 829
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); see also In re Hamilton Hardware Co., 11 Bankr. 326, 330
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comparable services in non-bankruptcy cases. 4
The threshold inquiry in making an award of fees from the bankruptcy
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (every determination of reasonable fee must begin with consid-
eration of total hours worked; such an approach will account for all relevant factors and
will lead to a reasonable result); Anderson & Miller, supra note 23, at 87 (time is factor
most frequently considered in calculating fee awards). See generally 2 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 1, 1 330.05[b], at 330-30 to -37 (discussing time factor).
Furthermore, Bankruptcy Rule 2016 explicitly requires that time spent on a case be
included in a fee application. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a). Indeed, it is deemed so
important to a fee determination that failure to substantiate the number of hours devoted
to particular tasks may prove fatal to a fee award. See In re Best Pack Seafood, 21 Bankr.
852, 854 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re G.W.C. Fin. & Ins. Servs., 8 Bankr. 122, 127
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). But cf In re Doctors, Inc., 4 Bankr. 346, 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1980) (bankruptcy trustee awarded compensation based on estimate of time expended on
case). See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, 330.05[b], at 330-30 to -38
(discussing time factor).
Time spent on a case is critical to the "lodestar" calculation that has become prevalent
in determining reasonable fee awards in bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy cases. The
"lodestar" is the product of the reasonable number of hours spent on a case multiplied by
a reasonable hourly rate, and may be adjusted up or down when warranted by other
factors. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council I, 478 U.S. 546, 564-65
(1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888-89 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 434 (1983); Norman v. Housing Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988); In re
Casco Bay Lines, 25 Bankr. 747, 756 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d
915, 920 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Bilgutay, 108 Bankr. 333, 339-40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989);
In re United States Lines, 103 Bankr. 427, 433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Jensen-
Farley Pictures, 47 Bankr. 557, 586 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); In re Erewhon, Inc., 21
Bankr. 79, 81-82 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court
Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 243 (1985).
Courts, however, should not weigh the time factor too heavily, or else bankruptcy
attorneys may become "hourly employees" rather than real professionals. See In re Jen-
sen-Farley Pictures, 47 Bankr. at 586 n.40 (citing In re Gloria Mfg. Corp., 20 Bankr. 603,
605 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982)). Moreover, focusing too closely on time spent on a case may
result in failure to recognize and reward efficiency and skill. See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy,
supra note 1, 330.05[b], at 330-32 to -35.
54. The "cost of comparable services" was the significant change instituted by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Its intended
effect was to do away with the notions of strict economy that governed fee awards under
the Act, and thus, to encourage qualified attorneys to practice bankruptcy by offering
them compensation comparable to what they would receive in other fields of practice.
See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, 330.05[e], at 330-49 to -53. By its plain
language, section 330(a)(1) directs bankruptcy courts to base fee decisions on, among
other factors, what an attorney would receive in a non-bankruptcy case for services per-
formed in a bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988). It does not define, how-
ever, what constitutes a compensable "actual, necessary service." See id.
Thus, weighing this or any other provision too heavily may violate fundamental canons
of statutory construction. See, e-g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa
Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (statutes should be interpreted so as not to render one part
inoperative); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (same); D. Ginsberg & Sons,
Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (effect should be given to every clause and part
of statute if possible); Exparte Public Nat'l Bank of New York, 278 U.S. 101, 104 (1928)
(same). This Note argues, therefore, that an almost mechanical application of section
330(a)(1) and explicit consideration of all the factors contained therein is warranted.
The cost of comparable services is but one factor to consider in determining what is a
reasonable amount of compensation. See In re City Planners & Developers, Inc., 5
Bankr. 217, 219 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1980). The inquiry should also consider the billing prac-
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estate, therefore, is whether efforts towards preparing, presenting and
even defending a fee application are "actual, necessary services" rendered
by the attorney to the estate.55 If that question can be answered affirma-
tively, then whether the amount requested is reasonable, in light of the
five factors listed,56 should be considered.
tices of the legal community. See In re Perros, 14 Bankr. 515, 518 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981).
For a discussion of the case law regarding what is the appropriate community for a
billing rate comparison, that is, which market rate to apply, see 2 Collier on Bankruptcy,
supra note 1, 330.05[2][e], at 330-51 to -55 n.34.
55. Section 330(a) does not explicitly state that "services" be rendered to the estate,
but it is the estate, after all, that is paying for them.
It is not feasible to list all the services for which a trustee or professional person may
receive compensation from the bankruptcy estate. See generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy,
supra note 1, 330.05[l], at 330-25 ("services are normally directed either towards pro-
tecting and increasing the available assets or towards decreasing the debtor's indebted-
ness") (emphasis added).
As propounded by the authors of Collier on Bankruptcy, the leading test for the com-
pensability of professional "services" is whether "the officer employing the professional
person is, by the Code, either directed or permitted to act, and [whether] compliance with
the duties or exercise of the privileges of such officer require professional advice or assist-
ance." Id.
56. Despite the five reasonably intelligible and unambiguous factors in section
330(a)(1), some bankruptcy courts have curiously decided to rely on twelve similar fac-
tors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., a civil rights case. Those
factors are: 1) time and labor required, 2) novelty and difficulty of questions presented, 3)
requisite skill, 4) preclusion of other employment by acceptance of the case, 5) customary
fees, 6) whether fee is fixed or contingent, 7) time limitations imposed by client or other
circumstances, 8) amount involved and results obtained, 9) experience, reputation and
ability of attorneys, 10) undesirability of the case, 11) nature and length of professional
relationship with the client and 12) awards in similar cases. See Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit later
deemed the twelve factors propounded in Johnson to be useful in fixing reasonable com-
pensation in bankruptcy cases under the Act. See Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v. Howard, 615
F.2d 1088, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980); American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Baddock (In re First
Colonial Corp. of Am.), 544 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977).
They have also seen wide use under the Code. See In re Humbert, 21 Bankr. 489, 492-93
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 39 Bankr. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Doyle-Lunstra
Sales Corp., 19 Bankr. 1003, 1005 (D.S.D. 1982); In re International Coins & Currency,
Inc., 22 Bankr. 127, 129 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); In re Warrior Drilling & Eng'g Co., 9
Bankr. 841, 848-50 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981); In re Underground Utils. Constr. Co., 13
Bankr. 735, 737 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re James Calvin Belk Constr. Co., 11 Bankr.
56, 58-60 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981); In re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 831 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1981); In re Jones, 13 Bankr. 192, 194 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); see also Lieb, supra
note 14, at 428 ("The strength of Johnson as the seminal authority is now unques-
tioned").
Using the twelve Johnson factors may be justified under the "cost of comparable serv-
ices" provision, as indicative of customary billing standards, because they closely track
fee guidelines in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.
See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (1989); see also Butenas, supra
note 7, at 79-81 (discussing similarities between section 330(a)(1), Johnson factors and
ABA fee guidelines).
However, the almost wholesale reception of the Johnson factors into the law of com-
pensation of bankruptcy attorneys is, at the very least, disturbing. Johnson was a 1974
civil rights case decided before the revision of compensation provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code. Although the five factors listed in section 330(a)(1) are nowhere deemed exclusive,
1338 [Vol. 58
BANKRUPTCY FEE APPLICATIONS
Judicial treatment of the issue, however, has not been conducted along
these simple lines. Instead of explicitly and simply deciding whether fee
application work is a compensable "actual, necessary service," the courts
have put the cart before the horse by exploring whether fee application
work is compensated in other types of cases, and thus have based their
decisions on imprecise analogies of questionable utility. 7
B. Judicial Treatment of the Issue
The two federal courts of appeal that have addressed the issue have
held that attorney time devoted to bankruptcy fee applications is com-
pensable.5 8 The bankruptcy and district courts, however, remain di-
vided. Several have held, without imposing any significant qualifications,
that time devoted to fee applications is compensable. 9 Others have sim-
ply denied such requests for compensation.6
In addition, various compromise rules have emerged: allowing com-
pensation for fee application work if the debtor is solvent and all the
creditors' claims are satisfied in full;6" allowing compensation for such
work, but at a reduced rate;62 or allowing compensation under various
the statute is unambiguous. The fact that all twelve factors were neither incorporated by
section 330(a)(1) nor mentioned in the legislative history of section 330, yet were cited in
the House and Senate Reports accompanying 42 U.S.C. § 1988, should not be passed
over lightly. That bankruptcy courts have seen fit to complicate their task by considering
twelve factors where Congress deemed only five to be necessary is cause for consterna-
tion.
Indeed, the utility of the Johnson factors has not gone unquestioned. See In re Casco
Bay Lines, 25 Bankr. 747, 754 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641
F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); cf City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470
(2d Cir. 1974) (citing similar list of factors and concluding that such a "conceptual amal-
gam is so extensive and ponderous that it is probably not employed in any precise way by
those courts espousing adherence to it").
For a detailed analysis of the construction and procedural application of the Johnson
factors in the context of fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, see Comment, supra note 13,
at 346-400.
57. See, e.g., In re Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding fee-
shifting cases most analogous to bankruptcy); In re The Vogue, 92 Bankr. 717, 723
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (suggesting more useful comparison is to private commercial
practice); In re National Paragon Corp., 74 Bankr. 858, 862 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
(bankruptcy is more analogous to common fund cases), rev'd on other grounds, 87 Bankr.
11 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
This approach fails to apply the plain language of section 330(a)(1): the cost of compa-
rable services is one of five factors to be considered in fixing a reasonable amount of
compensation. What services are compensated in other cases, however, does not define
what is a compensable service in bankruptcy.
58. See supra note 9.
59. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
61. See In re J.A. & L.C. Brown Co., 75 Bankr. 539, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Bible
Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39 Bankr. 768, 774 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
62. See, e.g., In re C & J Oil Co., 81 Bankr. 398, 405 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987) (75
percent hourly rate); In re Neibart Assoc. Press, 58 Bankr. 212, 215 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985) (at rate lower than that for "demanding legal services").
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exigent circumstances. 3 Most recently, a federal district court decided
that the appropriate measure of compensation for fee application work is
the difference between any amount the lawyer ordinarily charges his non-
bankruptcy clients and the cost of preparing and presenting bankruptcy
fee applications."
At least one bankruptcy decision has limited the number of hours
spent in fee application preparation, holding that such work should not
exceed three percent of the total hours submitted. 5 "Bending over back-
wards to be fair" in a later case, the same court decided to raise the
ceiling to ten percent of the total hours.6
1. In re Nucorp Energy
In re Nucorp Energy 67 is illustrative of the problems courts have in
applying the language of section 330(a)(1)68 to the nettlesome question of
compensating attorneys for fee application preparation. It receives spe-
cial attention here because it is so widely cited and because it draws spe-
cious analogies, under the guise of the "cost of comparable services"
factor, that have become the accepted terms in the current controversy.
Because of the dubious nature of such comparisons to other cases, this
Note argues for an approach that focuses on all of section 330(a)(1)'s
language rather than on only one of its five factors.
The bankruptcy court in Nucorp Energy authorized the employment of
the fee applicants as counsel for the debtors in possession.6 9 From the
commencement of the case until a chapter 11 trustee was appointed, the
fee applicants performed 6,500 hours of service for the debtors in posses-
sion.7° Interim fee applications were submitted on a bi-monthly basis,
63. See, e.g., In re Wiedau's, Inc., 78 Bankr. 904, 909 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1987) (time
spent preparing fee applications is cost of doing business and not compensable absent
"unusual circumstances"); In re Alan I.W. Frank Corp., 71 Bankr. 585, 586 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987) (time spent preparing fee applications is not compensable absent "extraordi-
nary circumstances") (citing In re ShafFer-Gordon Assocs., 68 Bankr. 344 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1986)); In re Beck-Rumbaugh Assocs., 68 Bankr. 882, 889 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
(excessive time spent on applications compensable because "vociferous" opposition con-
stituted "extraordinary" circumstance), aff'd, 84 Bankr. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re
WHET, Inc., .61 Bankr. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (only extra work required be-
yond what private client would expect in preparation of fee application is compensable);
In re Four Star Terminals, 42 Bankr. 419, 436 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984) (dicta) (time
spent defending fee application is compensable if objections are frivolous).
64. See In re McLean Indus., No. 89 Civ. 7935, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
1990).
65. See In re Wildman, 72 Bankr. 700, 711 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
66. See In re Churchfield Management & Inv. Corp., 98 Bankr. 838, 867 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989).
67. 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985). Nucorp Energy was a reorganization filed under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 27, 1982, by the debtor company and twenty-
seven of its affiliates. See id. at 656. The debtors employed approximately 2,000 persons
and had assets and liabilities in the hundreds of millions of dollars. See id.
68. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.




and the full amounts requested on each application were awarded. 7 1 At
all stages of the case the fee applications were unopposed.72 The final fee
application contained a request for $18,750 as compensation for time de-
voted to preparing and presenting the prior fee requests; the bankruptcy
court summarily denied it on vague policy grounds.73
In denying a motion for rehearing, the bankruptcy judge elaborated
that fee application preparation did not benefit the estate and was there-
fore undeserving of compensation.74 The district court affirmed that de-
cision without opinion.7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the
district court, directing it to award the fee applicants "reasonable com-
pensation for all 'actual, necessary services' rendered in connection with
the preparation and presentation of the fee application. ' 76
Reviewing the decisions below on the fee applicants' contention that
the bankruptcy court had erroneously applied section 330,7 7 the Ninth
Circuit observed that attorneys are statutorily obliged to submit detailed
fee applications to the bankruptcy court accounting for all services ren-
dered to the bankruptcy estate.78 Taking due notice of the reason for
that requirement-to enable courts to evaluate independently the neces-
sity of services for which compensation is sought as well as the reasona-
bleness of the fees requested-the Ninth Circuit concluded that fee
applications are necessary and that therefore their preparation and pres-
entation is a necessary service.79 Because attorneys must prepare fee ap-
plications in order to receive compensation, denying compensation
would "be fundamentally inequitable [and would] ignore the direct man-
date of section 330(a) that reasonable compensation be provided for all






76. See id. at 663.
77. The standard of review of fee determinations is "abuse of discretion" or "errone-
ous application of law." See Southwestern Media v. Rau, 708 F.2d 419, 422 (9th Cir.
1983).
78. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1985); see also supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing statutory obligation to submit fee
applications).
79. See Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 658.
80. See id. at 659; accord In re Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 630 F.2d 348, 351
(5th Cir. 1980) (remanding for award of reasonable compensation for fee application
preparation); Rose Pass Mines v. Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) ("We have long required an attorney to file a detailed account of the legal serv-
ices he provided the bankrupt in order to recover any compensation at all for his services.
It would be unduly penurious to require such an accounting without granting reasonable
compensation." (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). But see In re The Vogue, 92
Bankr. 717, 721-22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988):
The assertion that it is "fundamentally inequitable" not to allow bankruptcy
attorneys to bill their application preparation time, even if true, is beside the
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After stating the reasoning behind its conclusion that fee application
preparation is an "actual, necessary service" within the meaning of sec-
tion 330(a), the Ninth Circuit, by a mechanical application of the statute,
should have remanded the case for calculation of reasonable compensa-
tion for that service, using the five factors listed in section 330(a)(1). 81
Instead, the court launched into questionable dictum about the compen-
sability of fee application efforts in non-bankruptcy cases, under the sup-
posed authority of the fifth factor listed in section 330(a)(1)-"the cost of
comparable services" in non-bankruptcy cases., 2
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit found three broad non-bankruptcy cate-
gories analogous to bankrutpcy fee cases: "statutory fee," or "fee shift-
ing" cases, "common fund" cases and private practice.83  Because
point. Congress directed that the standard for allowing compensation be "the
cost of comparable services... ." Notions of "fairness" are outside the scope of
our inquiry. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has recently reminded us [that]
"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only
be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."
Id. (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)).
Further, the plain language of section 330(a) does not support the interpretation that it
is a "direct mandate" to award reasonable compensation for all actual and necessary
services performed in the case. The statute is merely permissive, stating that "the court
may award" reasonable compensation. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
81. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
82. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 659-62 (9th Cir. 1985). At least one
court has recognized Nucorp's exploration of compensation of fee application efforts in
other types of cases as "dicta." See In re Jessee, 77 Bankr. 59, 61 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1987).
Although not explicitly required by the statute, analogizing to and distinguishing from
non-bankruptcy cases has become the preferred method of approaching the issue of fee
application work compensability. This is apparently the result of reading too much into
the "cost of comparable services" factor in section 330, based on the legislative purpose
behind its inclusion in the statute. The courts' efforts would probably be better directed
towards ascertaining whether those congressional goals have been met, before considering
how similar legislative goals are implemented in other types of cases.
83. See Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 659-61.
In both "statutory fee" and "common fund" cases, attorneys' fees are awarded by the
court as in bankruptcy. Statutory fee cases involve "fee shifting"-reallocating the cost
of litigation among the parties-and thus constitute permitted statutory exceptions to the
traditional American rule of attorneys' fees. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
The typical example is a civil rights plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees from the defend-
ant. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 332-41 (discussing genesis of statutory fee
and common fund theories).
In contrast, common fund cases do not involve a shifting of fees from prevailing to
losing party, but rather an equitable sharing of costs among all beneficiaries of the litiga-
tion. The theory is that if one party has successfully litigated a claim producing a fund
available to a class of beneficiaries, the party taking the initiative by prosecuting the claim
should not be taxed with all its costs, while the other class members reap the benefits
without contributing to the litigation costs. Attorneys' fees are therefore awarded out of
the "common fund" so that the cost of the litigation is borne by all who benefit thereby.
See generally id. at 333 n.6 (discussing "common fund" theory).
The common fund doctrine was later expanded to become the "common benefit doc-
trine" in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), to cover situations where a
benefit was conferred on a class but not by creation of a "common fund." See Comment,
supra note 13, at 333 n.6. The "private attorney general" doctrine of fee shifting arose as
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statutory fee shifting and common fund cases are two broad areas in
which fees are court-awarded, the Ninth Circuit confined its comparison
to those areas.84 It then decided that fee awards in bankruptcy cases are
more analogous to fee awards in fee shifting cases than in common fund
cases.8" The court reached this conclusion by comparing the policy bases
behind attorney fee awards in bankruptcy, common fund and statutory
fee shifting cases.8 6 While the policy basis for attorney fee awards under
the common fund doctrine is similar to an action in quantum meruit, the
court found that the policy justifications for attorney fee awards in bank-
ruptcy and statutory fee shifting are virtually identical: encouraging
qualified counsel to practice bankruptcy and encouraging attorneys to
represent indigent plaintiffs with meritorious civil rights claims.8 7 The
Ninth Circuit commenced this policy comparison, however, after noting,
but ultimately ignoring, probably the most significant and fundamental
difference between fee shifting and bankruptcy cases-the source from
which attorney fees are paid. 8
In fee shifting cases, attorneys' fees are shouldered by the losing de-
an extension of the Mills reasoning applied in the context of civil rights litigation, until it
was abolished by the Supreme Court in 1975. See id. at 333-35.
For an account of the evolution of statutory fee shifting and common fund doctrine,
see generally id. at 332-39.
84. See Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 659.
85. See id. at 659-62.
86. See id. at 662. For a discussion of the theories behind common fund doctrine and
statutory fee shifting, see Comment, supra note 13, at 353-54.
87. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 662 (1985). Although the court
chose fee shifting in civil rights cases as the appropriate frame of reference, there are
many statutes, apart from civil rights acts, that provide for awards of attorneys' fees. See,
e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1962k (1988) (Ethics in Government Act of 1978); 7 U.S.C. § 18(f), (g)
(1988) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974); 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1988)
(Bank Holding Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988) (Trademark Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a) (1988) (Truth in Lending Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988) (Hobby Protection
Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1910(d) (1988) (Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships); 42 U.S.C. § 2184
(1988) (Atomic Energy Act of 1954). For a list of well over one hundred statutes provid-
ing for fee awards, see the inside cover of almost any edition of the Att'y Fee Awards
Rep./Bankr. Fee Section.
Nevertheless, the policies behind fee shifting in civil rights cases and bankruptcy fee
awards may not be as closely analogous as the court suggested. Statutory fee shifting
permits a prevailing plaintiff to "sock the loser" with his attorneys' fees in order to en-
courage the filing of civil rights lawsuits and to deter future wrongdoing. See In re The
Vogue, 92 Bankr. 717, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
In section 330, however, "[tihere simply was no public policy directive to positively
'encourage' or to 'promote' the filing of bankruptcy cases or to deter anybody from any-
thing." Id. at 723. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the basic objective of section 330
is to encourage attorneys to enter bankruptcy practice, and that bankruptcy practice can
be markedly different from the "zero-sum" type of litigation at the root of typical fee
shifting cases. Thus, more importantly, an award of attorneys' fees for civil rights plain-
tiffs is "entirely contingent upon prevailing on the merits; this concept is alien to § 330."
Id.
88. The court simply stated that "[tihe source of attorneys' fees in bankruptcy cases is
not parallel to the source of fees in other statutory fee cases.... [I]t is not parallel to that
in the common fund cases either." Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 662.
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fendant in addition to his liability for the judgment. In common fund
cases, fees are paid from the judgment recovered from the losing defend-
ant by the successful litigant and his attorneys, and are thus shared by all
who benefit from the fund created thereby. There is no additional liabil-
ity imposed on the defendant for attorneys' fees. In bankruptcy, attor-
neys' fees are paid from the bankruptcy estate. Thus, in bankruptcy and
common fund cases attorneys' fees are not paid by an adversary; in fee
shifting cases they are. The source of attorneys' fees is therefore more
similar in bankruptcy and common fund than in bankruptcy and fee
shifting. Hence, aside from arguably similar policy objectives the only
characteristic shared by bankruptcy and fee shifting, but not by common
fund, is that the authorization for court-awarded attorneys' fees is statu-
tory. Moreover, statutory fee shifting does not require as much judicial
supervision in setting the fee as do common fund and bankruptcy cases,
where, it has been said, fee applications are without "natural enemies.""
In Nucorp Energy, however, the Ninth Circuit chose to follow the fee
shifting cases, because of their similar policy objectives, stating that ef-
forts devoted to fee applications are "uniformly" held to be compensable
by the federal courts, and that they should therefore be compensable in
bankruptcy.90 Compensating for fee-related efforts, the court noted, pre-
vents the dilution of fee awards by uncompensated hours devoted to pre-
paring and defending fee applications. 91 Justifying one's fee, therefore,
should not be absorbed as a cost of doing business. Nucorp attempted to
justify this policy-based comparison, without even considering whether
the similar policy had been effected, by stating that the source of fees in
bankruptcy are not parallel to those in fee shifting or common fund
cases.
92
2. The Trouble with Analogies
Nucorp did articulate some compelling similarities between bank-
ruptcy fees and fee shifting: both are statutory at root, and both serve
similar policies.93 If section 330(a)(1), however, is interpreted as requir-
ing a comparison to other cases in which fees are awarded by the court, it
is virtually impossible to escape the stark similarity between the effect of
a bankruptcy fee award and that of fees awarded from a common fund:
both reduce the total amount ultimately available to distributees.94 But if
89. See In re Gianulias, 98 Bankr. 27, 28 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989); Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 251 (1985).
90. See Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 659-60.
This may not be true. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 353-57 (discussing
split of authority on this issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as of 1980).
91. See In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 661 (9th Cir. 1985).
92. See id. at 662.
93. See supra notes 85-86, 90 and accompanying text.
94. Bankruptcy cases are most akin to common fund cases. See In re The Vogue, 92
Bankr. 717, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re National Paragon Corp., 74 Bankr. 858,
862 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 87 Bankr. 11 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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the policy behind the court's authority to make a fee award is the appro-
priate point of comparison, then an additional similarity between com-
mon fund and bankruptcy can be noted-the policy of preventing unjust
enrichment. This policy is relevant in bankruptcy because not everyone
who benefits from the creation and distribution of a bankruptcy estate
employs their own counsel to represent them in that process. This could
certainly be the justification for a court-awarded fee in bankruptcy cases
absent the statutory authorization in the Code. Given these similarities
between bankruptcy and common fund cases, the rationale for denying
compensation for fee application work in the latter (lack of benefit to the
fund by the attorney's effort to establish his fee)95 should also apply to
the former, since it jibes with a fundamental goal of bankruptcy law-
maximizing return to creditors-and has been expressed as a require-
ment for compensation.96 Thus, applying a statute that suggests a com-
parison to the "cost of comparable services" in non-bankruptcy cases, as
a measure of an appropriate fee in a bankruptcy case, degenerates into an
analysis of the policies behind fee awards in various cases.
95. See Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 661 (citing City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 560
F.2d 1093, 1102 (2d Cir. 1977)). See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 353-54 (dis-
cussing "equitable fund doctrine" and reasoning behind disallowing fee application com-
pensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on "equitable fund" principles).
96. Compensation for fee application work has been disallowed precisely because no
benefit to the estate was recognized in the attorney's efforts to justify his fee. See In re
Jessee, 77 Bankr. 59, 61 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987). The Jessee court took a broad view of
the issue and recognized that
allowance of the additional fee application [solely for the defense of a previous
application] could have a detrimental effect upon the Debtor's ability to carry
out her confirmed Chapter 11 plan. Further, the allowance and payment of the
fees would benefit no creditor, would not benefit the Debtor, and would inure
only to the benefit of the.., attorney for the Debtor in Possession.
Id.
For other cases requiring benefit to the estate as a prerequisite to a compensation
award, see supra note 52 (discussing "value" element of section 330(a)(1) and majority
rule requiring benefit to the estate for award of compensation for services of debtor's
attorney).
The conclusion that no benefit at all flows to the estate by an attorney's efforts to
prepare a fee application, however, fails to consider the purpose of fee applications.
Although attorneys are free to act as volunteers if they wish, there is absolutely no reason
to expect that they will. Congress' concern was with the smooth functioning of the bank-
ruptcy process, and to that end, they sought to attract able counsel to practice in the field.
To that end, Congress recognized that compensation is necessary to gain and maintain
their participation. Carefully prepared fee applications benefit the estate by enabling the
bankruptcy judge to review the requested compensation to ensure the estate does not pay
too much in legal fees. "Detailed billing information is of importance to all parties, as
well as to the court." In re Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d at 659.
To the extent that it cannot be considered part of the "value" element of section
330(a)(1), however, benefit to the estate is not a measure of an amount of reasonable
compensation for actual, necessary services; and it is not an explicit element of "service."
Although the "benefit" to the estate from a bankruptcy fee application, albeit real, is
undeniably remote, it does not appear that it should therefore be excluded from the realm
of "actual, necessary services." The term "service" connotes some benefit, but direct
benefit is not a requirement on the face of the statute.
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Furthermore, deciding what area of non-bankruptcy practice is the ap-
propriate point of comparison is problematic: is it in other cases where
fees are awarded by the court, or where fees are paid by the client?
Choosing the area of court-awarded fees presumes that the congressional
purpose behind section 330(a) was not to attract competent counsel from
all areas of the law to bankruptcy practice, but only those who look to
the courts for payment of their fees. Should the bankruptcy courts then
compete with the rest of the judiciary to attract the most qualified of
those attorneys?
On the other hand, in what other field is a "service" comparable to
preparing a fee application for court-awarded fees performed? It should
be noted that virtually every attorney performing services with the expec-
tation of receiving compensation, whether by court approval or from a
private client, must justify his requested fee. Typical commercial clients,
as well as assertive individuals, will demand and receive billing infor-
mation from their counsel.97 If such expectations of attorneys and their
clients are the norm, the next inquiry should be whether there is "some-
thing inherently different in practice before a bankruptcy court which
makes the process of obtaining one's fees materially more onerous than
in practice outside of bankruptcy court."9
That fee applications require detail is written into the Bankruptcy
Rules and is otherwise well-established.9 9 Requirements, however, may
vary from court to court and from case to case, perhaps explaining why
courts differ on whether those requirements are significantly more bur-
densome in bankruptcy than non-bankruptcy cases."c° Generally, how-
ever, the requirements are not Draconian and the task of meeting them is
not herculean. 1o
In this light, at least one bankruptcy court, noting that a private client
97. See In re The Vogue, 92 Bankr. 717, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Petti-
bone Corp., 74 Bankr. 293, 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987). But see Lerman, Lying to Cli-
ents, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 720 (1990) ("Most clients do not ask for detailed
explanations of their bills; if a bill appears reasonable clients usually pay without ques-
tion, even though they are unhappy that legal fees are so high.")
Two factual questions asked by the The Vogue court are: 1) "Do attorneys normally
bill their clients for the time spent in preparing their bill?"; and 2) "Do attorneys nor-
mally bill their clients for the time spent meeting with a client to explain, discuss, negoti-
ate or haggle over (the practical equivalent of appearing in court on a fee application)
their bill?" The Vogue, 92 Bankr. at 720. To both questions the fee applicant conceded
that they do not. See id. But cf Lerman, supra, at 715 n.235 (citing example of appar-
ently accepted practice of charging for paralegal time spent preparing bills).
98. In re The Vogue, 92 Bankr. at 720.
99. See supra notes 1-2, 6 and accompanying text.
100. Compare In re Nucorp Energy, 764 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy fee
process requires "far more" than ordinary client) with The Vogue, 92 Bankr. at 723 (ordi-
nary clients do not require "much less" billing information).
101. See, eg., In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, 47 Bankr. 557, 582 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)
(although record keeping requirement is important it "'should not be imposed in a dra-
conian manner.' (quoting Action on Smoking and Health v. C.A.B., 724 F.2d 211, 220
(D.C. Cir. 1984))); see also In re Pettibone Corp., 74 Bankr. 293, 302 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1987) (adequately explaining how time was spent is "not an overly burdensome task" for
[Vol. 581346
BANKRUPTCY FEE APPLICATIONS
presented with a substantial fee would expect substantial detail in the
bill, decided to compensate the fee applicant only for fee work over and
beyond what a private client would expect."°2 Striking an advisory tone,
the court stated that "if contemporaneous time records are kept, the as-
sembling of that information is not a major undertaking."103 The very
fact, however, that no consensus has been reached on what does occur in
other cases, 1" reveals the uselessness of the precise analogies the courts
have tried to draw in giving effect to the "cost of comparable services"
element of section 333(a)(1).
III. COMPENSATION FOR FEE-RELATED EFFORTS SHOULD
BE RESTRICTED
Notwithstanding the time spent by bankruptcy attorneys preparing,
presenting, and defending fee applications, there are good reasons for de-
nying or restricting compensation for such efforts.
fee applicants); In re Hotel Assocs., 15 Bankr. 487, 488 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The
Court does not require a fee application the size of a boring victorian novel.").
In fact, even fee applications that do not fully satisfy the courts' penchant for detail
have been deemed sufficient. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Charles N.
Wooten, Ltd. (In re Evangeline Refining Co.), 890 F.2d 1312, 1326 (5th Cir. 1989); see
also 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 330-33 to -34 n.17 (discussing standard fee
application requirements).
Basically, the operative standard is whether the application provides sufficient informa-
tion for the court to independently evaluate whether the fees requested are actual, neces-
sary and reasonable. See Evangeline Ref Co., 890 F.2d at 1326. For an illustration of the
level of detail generally expected by a court in a fee application, see Pettibone, 74 Bankr.
at 301-02.
In New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir.
1983), the Second Circuit set forth the requirement that applications for court-awarded
compensation must be documented with contemporaneous time records specifying, "for
each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." Id. at
1148. As observed in In re Cena's Fine Furniture, 109 Bankr. 575, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1990),
this requirement is mirrored in the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the Eastern District of
New York. See also In re Bilgutay, 108 Bankr. 333, 341-43 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
(appendix of (non-mandatory) "Guidelines for Fee Applications").
102. See In re WHET, Inc., 61 Bankr. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
103. Id. Keeping contemporaneous time records, however, may not be too common a
practice among most lawyers. See, eg., Lerman, supra note 97, at 716 ("Failure to keep
precise records of work time was perhaps the most prevalent deceptive billing practice
among [lawyers interviewed by the author]."). Nevertheless, that many, or even a major-
ity, of lawyers fail to accurately account for their time should not excuse those who are
called on to do so. It is really the least that should be expected of professionals who
generally charge by the hour.
104. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
An understanding of what does occur in other cases, however, should be reached. If
fee documentation is generally considered part of the overhead included in an attorney's
hourly rate, an attorney recovering for preparing a fee application recovers twice for the
same work. Such a result is clearly unreasonable and should be prevented. Therefore, if
an attorney's hourly rate is to be used in calculating a fee award in a bankruptcy case, it is
important to know what items are included in that hourly rate. Cf Butenas, supra note
7, at 86 (advising that to defend his hourly rate an attorney should understand how it is
constructed in terms of what items are and are not considered overhead, and stating that
costs customarily passed on to clients should be reimbursable in a bankruptcy case).
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First, as a general proposition, allowing compensation for fee applica-
tion work is contrary to the traditional American rule of attorneys'
fees."05 Because submitting a fee application is the way an attorney at-
tempts to meet his burden of proof regarding entitlement to a fee, and
because in seeking a fee the attorney is acting adversely to the bank-
ruptcy estate, compensating efforts to meet that burden constitute an un-
authorized shifting of fee liability. Section 330(a) authorizes payment of
fees to professionals employed by parties sharing an interest in conserv-
ing or increasing the size of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, no real fee
shifting is contemplated by the statute. When an attorney, however, is
compensated for asserting interests against the estate, real fee shifting
does occur.
Second, allowing such compensation creates the wrong incentives for
lawyers. It is easy to see how such a rule of compensation can be abused
by attorneys attempting to "hedge" fee requests that may be subject to
disallowance or discounting by the court upon review. Knowing that
time spent preparing, presenting and defending a fee application is com-
pensable, an attorney might not shy away from including questionable
items on the application because he would have nothing to lose by doing
so."0 6 Accordingly, less scrupulous attorneys 10 7 might simply choose to
pad fee requests in order to stir up opposition, thus increasing the
number of compensable hours devoted to preparing and defending an
application. Of course, such abuse could be checked by denying compen-
sation for a losing effort at defending a "padded" fee request.108
Third, the notion that a professional person can be compensated for
105. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
106. At least two courts have made this same observation. See In re Four Star Termi-
nals, Inc., 42 Bankr. 419, 437 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984); In re Erewhon, 21 Bankr. 79, 89
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). But see In re Pettibone Corp., 74 Bankr. 293, 304 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1987) (compensation should be allowed because otherwise "professionals would have
little incentive to engage in a comprehensive review of the time expended and the value
thereof").
This view, however, is hardly persuasive. That an attorney's entire fee request may be
denied, or substantially reduced, for failing to meet his burden of proof should provide a
much greater incentive to submit satisfactory applications than the few dollars to be
earned from the time spent preparing one. This "stick" rather than "carrot" approach
would surely encourage better record keeping by attorneys, thus reducing the number of
hours ultimately spent preparing an application. Further, the idea that attorneys should
be paid for efforts towards establishing entitlement to a fee, in order to encourage the
making of that effort in the first place, is totally divorced from common sense.
107. In a recent case, an attorney serving as trustee in a number of cases was accused
of fraudulent billing. Examining only nine fee applications filed by the attorney, who was
working on over 250 cases simultaneously, the court discovered that on at least six days
he personally billed over twenty-four hours per day. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wooten (In re Evangeline Refining Co.), 890 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir.
1989).
108. Cf. Evangeline Refining Co., 890 F.2d at 1323-24 (fraudulent fee applications are
punished by denying all compensation); Comment, supra note 13, at 356 (courts can
employ equitable powers to punish and deter ill motivated fee litigation). Rule 11 sanc-
tions may also be appropriate.
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time spent preparing and even arguing over a bill for services shocks the
conscience of ordinary persons. That such charges may be taxed against
the bankruptcy estate of a debtor who has sought the protection of the
bankruptcy laws because he has had trouble paying his debts in the first
place only makes the proposition more frightening. Compensating bank-
ruptcy attorneys for time devoted to fee applications, therefore, could
create a public image problem for the bankruptcy bar and ultimately
frustrate the congressional goal of attracting competent and upstanding
attorneys to practice in the field.
Even apart from these concerns, however, bankruptcy courts should
conclude that the text of section 330 itself functions to significantly limit
awards of compensation for fee application work. Because any benefit to
the estate from an attorney's fee application is, at best, only remote, the
"value" element of section 330(a)(1) should be viewed as the most formi-
dable statutory barrier to compensation.
Absent further instruction from Congress, however, a per se rule of
denying compensation for fee application work should not be adopted.
Section 330(a)(1) contains other elements, such as "time," that must also
be considered. If an attorney is required to spend excessive time pursu-
ing an application because of peculiar demands of the court, some com-
pensation will be warranted.
It is important to recognize the tension between quality and quantity
built into section 330.109 On one hand, the factors of the "nature" and
"value" of services require that compensation be awarded for services
based on their subjective worth (suggesting that each service be evaluated
independently); on the other hand, the factors of "time" and the "cost of
comparable services" (to the extent that non-bankruptcy work is billed
for by the hour) require awards based on the objective factor of time
spent on a case. Computations based on the number of hours expended
on a case, such as "lodestar," are therefore clearly inappropriate because
they fail to account for the variety of "services" performed during that
time and their subjective nature and value. Likewise, compensation deci-
sions based only on worth are also wrong.
By the language of section 330(a) itself, neither value nor time should
serve as the sole benchmarks for compensation decisions. The tension,
discussed above, between the section's five factors, suggests some balance
be struck. As a rule of thumb, therefore, if necessary services with little
or no value to the estate take a great deal of time to perform, some com-
pensation should be awarded, but tempered in amount by the lack of
value to the estate. A similar balance should be struck in the case of
services of great value to the estate that take very little time to perform.
Weighing all of the factors, it is clear that fee application work gener-
ally should not command compensation parallel to that for "real" serv-
109. See generally Butenas, supra note 7, at 83-85 (dividing section 330(a) into "qual-
tiy, .... quantity" and "result" factors).
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ices to the bankruptcy estate. Time devoted by an attorney to his fee
application is time spent pursuing his own pecuniary interests, and at
root should be considered as properly absorbed as a cost of doing
business.
No precise and easy formula can be devised, however, and different
results may obtain in exceptional cases. By the terms of the statute,
though, all of the factors must be considered; reasonableness is the only
key. Ninety years ago, a court warned that
the dignity and honor of the profession are not conserved, or its
influence for good promoted, by excessive allowance for service. That
would lend countenance to the suggestion sometimes heard that the
commercial spirit of the age has invaded even the legal profession, to
the impairment of its dignity, the blunting of its sense of honor; that a
profession instituted for the maintenance of justice has become degen-
erate, and that its main calling now is a vulgar scramble for the "al-
mighty dollar." We cannot bend our judgment to lend sanction to a
foul aspersion. 110
Indeed, as public scorn for attorneys in general is reaching new
heights,"1 these words of moderation should not be forgotten.
CONCLUSION
Preparing, presenting, and defending bankruptcy fee applications does
take time. Courts, however, need to make clear whether such efforts
constitute "actual, necessary services" within the meaning of section
330(a). While any benefit to the estate from such efforts is undeniably
remote, if not actually adverse, a bankruptcy attorney cannot get paid
without presenting a fee application. Therefore, if bankruptcy courts
conclude that fee-related efforts are necessary services, they should apply
the language of section 330(a)(1), being careful to weigh each of its five
factors when fixing an award of compensation. Compensation should be
awarded by the courts for fee application work only in special circum-
110. In re Curtis, 100 F. 784, 795 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 179 U.S. 683 (1900) (quoted
in In re Consolidated Distribs., 298 F. 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1924); In re Kentucky Elec.
Power Corp., 11 F. Supp. 528, 531 (W.D. Ky. 1935); In re Hamilton Hardware Co., 11
Bankr. 326, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981)).
111. Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary, commenting on a speech by
the President, remarked, "[l]awyers certainly deserve all the criticism they can get....
Everyone ought to take every opportunity to blast lawyers." Fitzwater v. Lawyers, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1990, at All, col. 1. Asked whether he was expressing the President's or
his own feelings, Fitzwater responded, "[tihose are universally held feelings by everyone
who has ever dealt with the legal establishment." Id.; see also S. Stein, A Feast for Law-
yers xvii (1989) (bankruptcy is "an area of legal practice that has contributed perhaps
more than its share to the precipitous decline of the reputation of a once great
profession").
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stances, and only after the reasons for doing so are carefully explained in
the terms provided by the statute.
James B. Hirsch

